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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DeBRY AND HILTON TRAVEL 
SERVICES, INC., : 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, : 
vs. Case No. 14335 
CAPITOL INTERNATIONAL 
AIRWAYS, INC., 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
t The Plaintiff and Appellant DeBry and Hilton Travel 
Services, Inc., respectfully petitions this Honorable Court 
for rehearing in the above-entitled case, pursuant to Rule 
76(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the following 
reasons: 
1. The Court's interpretation of regulations of 
the Civil Aeronautics Board is in direct conflict with the 
controlling federal statute providing remedies to the parties. 
2. The trial court did not make and enter findings 
of fact or conclusions upon which the above-entitled Court 
based its opinion. 
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t f u l l y submi/t 
^6" r. , 
(5£ARK W. SESSI 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The petition of Plaintiff-Appellant DeBry and Hilton 
Travel Services, Inc., is not filed for the purpose of re-
arguing matters originally presented. It is intended to 
bring to the Court's attention errors in its conclusions 
and an omission to consider material points in the case. The 
petition is within the criteria established by this Court for 
the granting of rehearing. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF REGULATIONS OF THE 
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD IS IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH THE 
CONTROLLING FEDERAL STATUTE PROVIDING REMEDIES TO THE 
PARTIES. 
The Court's Opinion is based largely upon an inter-
1 
pretation of regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board. 
X14 C.F.R., § 208.3(b) (1976). 
-2-
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In its Opinion, the Court states as follows: 
"It is not open to question and the findings of 
the trial court recite that the Civil Aeronautics Board 
Regulations apply to both defendant Capitol, as a sup-
plemental air carrier, and to plaintiffs DeBry, as 
ticket agent, and that they require a written agreement 
for the payment of commissions to a ticket agent." 
The Opinion goes on to quote in pertinent part 
Section 208.31a of the CAB Regulations as follows: 
"Each agreement between a supplemental air 
carrier and any ticket . . . agent shall be reduced 
to. writing and signed by all the parties thereto, if 
it relates to any of the following subjects . . . (b) 
The arranging for flights for the accomodation of 
persons . . . ;" 
Later in the Opinion, the Court, in interpreting the 
purposes of the Regulation quoted above, indicates that one of 
the main purposes in requiring a contract of the nature here 
in question to be in writing is to provide a sound foundation 
for settling disputes which may arise as to who is entitled to 
commissions; and further that a party claiming such commis-
sions has a burden of proving such a written contract or 
otherwise satisfying the requirement. In short, the above-
entitled Court construes the Regulation to be a sort of 
"statute of frauds" for the airline charter industry. 
DeBry respectfully submits, however, that the above-
entitled Court's analysis has overlooked and ignored the 
controlling federal statute specifying the remedies of parties 
which provides as follows: 
"Nothing contained in this chapter shall in any 
way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at com-
mon law or by statute, but the provisions of this 
-3-
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chapter are in addition to such remedies." (emphasis 
added) 
49 U.S.C.A. § 1506. 
It would follow, then, that if DeBry was entitled 
to enforce the terms of an oral brokerage contract and to 
collect commissions at common law, the federal statute would 
prohibit the regulations from in any way abridging or alter-
ing DeBry's rights with respect thereto. Notwithstanding 
the general rule that statutes requiring contracts for the 
employment of brokers to be in writing are in derogation of 
2 
the common law, the above-entitled Court has held that DeBry 
cannot enforce and collect such commissions under common law 
principles without first "proving such a written contract or 
otherwise satisfying the requirement." Such a holding appears 
to be in direct conflict with the clear language of the stat-
ute and such a holding does in fact alter and abridge DeBryfs 
right with respect to commissions and the enforcement of the 
terms of an oral brokerage contract the existence of which 
was stipulated to by both of the respective parties. The 
foregoing principles were presented to the above-entitled 
Court on pages 23-25 of the Brief of Appellant. 
The legislative history of Section 208.31a of the 
Civil Aeronautics Board Regulations sustains the conclusion 
that such section was originally implemented to assist the 
CAB in policing the activities of charter airlines by 
212 Am. Jur. 2d, Brokers, § 41, p. 803. 
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imposing certain reporting requirements on such charter air-
lines , not to defeat the right of a broker to commissions 
due the broker under the terms of an oral brokerage contract. 
The geneology of that regulation is as follows: 
On November 15, 1955, by Order E-9744, the CAB 
granted exemption authority to a number of charter air 
carriers (then called "large irregular carriers"). One 
condition of this authority was that the agreements between 
> 
the air carriers and the ticket agents be reduced to writing. 
By Order E-13436 issued January 28, 1959, the CAB 
granted Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity to 
23 supplemental airlines. The condition requiring written 
contracts between carriers and their ticket agents was carried 
over from the exemptions to these certificates. 
A condition requiring written contracts remained in 
the certificates until September 27, 1966, when it was moved 
to the Regulations, becoming Section 298.31a by the Board's 
Order in the Supplemental Air Service Proceedings. 
The regulatory intent can be traced from 14 C.F.R. 
Part 242 (August 28, 1952), which states in part: "The 
proposed amendments are designed to obtain more uniform and 
in some respects more detailed data in response to these 
reporting requirements of these provisions of the regulations." 
Compare 14 C.F.R. Part 242 (January 7, 1953), which 
states: 
-5-
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" . . . the objectives are to improve uniformity of 
reported information and to provide the Board with 
more adequate information." 
A companion regulation requires contracts for 
charter carriage to be in writing. 14 C.F.R. Part 208.31b. 
The regulatory history of that section is similar: 
"The execution and retention of written contracts 
on the other hand will greatly assist the Board in 
monitoring the carriers1 compliance with charter 
regulations and Board tariffs." 
14 C.F.R. Part 208 (June 20, 1967). 
Thus it is clearly the Board's intent to regulate 
the air carrier for protection of the public, not to give the 
air carrier a loophole through which it can avoid its common 
law obligations pursuant to a contract formed under weill 
established common law principles. The title to Part 208 of 
the regulations, "Terms, Conditions and Limitations of Certi-
ficates to Engage in Supplemental Air Transportation", 14 
C.F.R. Part 208.1, reflects that the regulations are aimed 
not at the public or even the air charter industry. The 
regulation is a part of the carriers' Certificate of Public 
Convenience and Necessity—nothing more, nothing less, The 
Certificate so conditioned may fairly be paraphrased as 
follows: Capitol is permitted to engage in the business of k 
a charter airline on the condition (inter alia) that Capitol 
maintain written records of all its transactions. The effect 
of Capitol's failure to satisfy such a condition is simply 
that Capitol violates the term of its Certificate. It stretches 
-6-
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the imagination to suppose that the Civil Aeronautics Board 
ever intended (let alone had the power and authority) to 
abrogate or change the common law requirements of the validity 
and enforceability of contracts. 
The Opinion rendered by the above-entitled Court 
will have far-reaching effects on the entire charter air-
line industry. That industry is now regulated by a delicate 
balance of common law principles as well as complex Govern-
> 
ment regulations. The Opinion of this Court has by judicial 
interpretation imposed a further unwarranted requirement on 
the entire airline charter industry. This is particularly 
true where, as in the instant case, the contract forms are 
not submitted by the airline (Capitol) for execution by the 
broker (DeBry) until after the flights are negotiated, 
prices and terms finalized and agreed upon and the broker's 
performance substantially completed (R. 811). Such a 
requirement leaves no protection to a broker who in good 
faith introduces his customer to the airline, negotiates 
the terms of transportation and is willing to execute the 
written contract. It is difficult to believe that the regu-
lations of the Civil Aeronautics Board, as interpreted by 
the above-entitled Courts contemplate such a result, particu-
larly where the obvious legislative intent is to require the 
airline to comply with record keeping requirements and to 
provide the CAB with uniform and detailed reported information. 
-7-
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT MAKE AND ENTER FINDINGS 
OF FACT OR CONCLUSIONS UPON WHICH THE ABOVE-ENTITLED 
COURT BASED ITS OPINION. 
The Court recognizes that "procuring cause" is a 
central issue in this case. The Opinion states in part, 
"Plaintiffs urge that even though they had no writ-
ten contract they were entitled to the commissions 
because: (a) the evidence shows that they were the 
actual procuring agency in booking the flights in 
question . . . . We recognize the soundness of the 
principles of law advocated by Plaintiffs as to the 
propositions just stated. . . . " 
DeBry pointed out on pages 8 through 16 of the 
Brief of Appellant that procuring cause is the central issue 
in any litigation over brokerage commissions. Frederick May 
& Co. v. Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368 P.2d 266 (1962). 
However, after correctly acknowledging the import-
ance of the procuring cause issue, this Court concluded that 
the trial court had made a finding on that issue. The 
Opinion states: 
"We recognize the soundness of the principles 
of law advocated by plaintiffs as to the propositions 
just stated, [procuring cause] when they are applied 
under appropriate circumstances. But the difficulty 
with the plaintiff's position is that the trial court 
did not find the facts as they contend to bring the 
case within those principles . . . . However plausible 
the plaintiff's arguments may seem to themselves, the 
trial court, whose prerogative it is to find facts, was 
not so persuaded." 
This Court's Opinion speculates that DeBry was not 
the procuring:cause, for the sale. However there is absolutely 
-8-
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nothing in the findings adopted by the trial court on the 
issue of procuring cause. There is simply no way to stretch 
the findings of the trial court to include anything concerning 
the issue of "procuring cause." 
DeBry specifically requested the Court to make a 
finding on this material issue, but the trial court made 
none. The trial court might have made a finding that DeBry 
was the procuring cause or the trial court might l^ ave made 
a finding that DeBry was not the procuring cause. However, 
the court made no finding either way, which DeBry respect-
fully submits the trial court was required to do as a matter 
of law. Gaddis Investment Co. v. Morrison, 3 Utah 2d 43, 
278 P.2d 284 (1954). Such a finding either way would elimin-
ate any speculation as to whether DeBry was or was not the 
procuring cause of the flights in question. 
DeBry has contended and argued, both in the trial 
court and in this appeal, that the arrangement for all three 
parties to execute a charter agency agreement was only a 
formality. The trial court determined that such arrange-
ment was a condition precedent to DeBry's entitlement to 
receive commission. 
The thrust of the opinion of the above-entitled 
Court is that the findings of fact of the trial court would 
not now be reviewed. DeBry respectfully submits that the 
construction of the arrangement between the parties as a 
condition precedent or a formality is an issue of law for 
-9-
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the above-entitled Court to determine. If the arrangement 
was a condition precedent as the trial court determined and 
the condition was not waived by Capitol, the decision of the 
trial court was proper. If the reverse is true, the judg-
ment of the trial court should be reversed. It is just that 
simple. 
While the above-entitled Court is on solid ground 
in its refusal to weigh the evidence presented in the trial 
court, it appears that the Opinion of this Court does not 
consider this, the pivotal legal issue, properly presented 
for review, i.e., Was the arrangement for all three parties 
to execute a charter agency agreement a condition precedent 
to DeBry's entitlement to commissions or a mere formality 
after DeBry's substantial performance? The general rule 
with respect to this question has been stated as follows: 
"It has been said that conditions precedent 
are not favored and the courts will not construe 
stipulations to be such unless required to do so 
by plain, unambiguous language or by necessary 
implication. This is particularly so when inter-
preting a stipulation as a condition precedent 
rather than a promise or covenant would work a 
forfeiture or result in inequitable consequences." 
17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, § 321. 
This issue was presented in detail on pages 20 
and 21 of the Brief of Appellant and pages 11 through 13 of 
the Reply Brief of Appellant. 
-10-
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Appellant DeBry 
and Hilton Travel Services, Inc., respectfully submits that 
its Petition for Rehearing should be granted. 
illy submittec 
URK W. 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Petition for Rehearing and Appellant's Brief 
in Support of Petition for Rehearing was mailed to STRONG & 
HANNI, Suite 604, Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, 
and to GINSBURG & KOHN, 9454 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 800, 
Beverly Hills, California, 90 212, Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent Capitol International Airways, Inc., in a 
postage prepaid, properly addressed envelope, on this 
day of November, 1976. 
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CLAiSK W. SESSIONS 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
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